

Allen Dulles on Espionage Spies and Policy

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The Craft of Intelligence, by Allen Dulles. New York: Harper & Row, 277 pp. \$4.95.

By Courtney Sheldon

This is a rare combination, indeed—true-story spy thrillers by a distinguished intelligence sleuth who at the same time advocates new governmental policies of great public import.

Allen Dulles, for eight years the director of the globally operating Central Intelligence Agency, does not by any means ladle out choice secrets from the CIA's kettleful. But he does give the reader a strong whiff of what is cooking. And what can now be told of the CIA makes one of the most amazing stories of our time. "The Craft of Intelligence" is easily read, informative, challenging, and entertaining all in one breath.

The CIA is a youngster as national intelligence agencies go. It was formed after World War II when the United States abandoned the notion that gentlemen don't spy.

Today the consensus is that the United States jolly well has to know what its enemies are up to if it is to survive. And, as Mr. Dulles points out, a U.S. flying overhead is a border violation for which men on foot, in autos, and on trains have set many a spectacular precedent. It is more dramatic and offensive to a spied-upon nation, to be sure.

Many people are aware of CIA activities in Iran and Guatemala which blocked the threat of Communist take-overs. Mr. Dulles says there were many other such enter-

prises. He leaves the impression that the United States is now doing far better than the Communists in espionage and counterespionage.

Parts of Mr. Dulles's spy tales have been widely speculated on. But of all the men in government in the last two decades, probably no one is better equipped to put the piecemeal, unverified stories in perspective than Mr. Dulles.

One of the CIA's major coups, in Mr. Dulles's opinion, was the acquisition of a copy of Mr. Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin. It was obtained, he now says, "many miles from Moscow, where it had been delivered."

Mr. Dulles is understandably perturbed when the CIA is mistakenly blamed for failures. It has had its bad days, but contrary to popular impression, he says, the CIA had warned American officials what Britain and France were likely to do in the Suez invasion. The intelligence community predicted with great accuracy the approximate time the Soviet sputnik would be launched, he recalls.

As for CIA recruiting, Mr. Dulles concludes he would "much prefer taking the raw material which we find in America—naïve, home-grown, even home-spun—and training such a man to be a good intelligence officer, however long the process lasts, to seeking out people who are naturally devious, conspiratorial or wily, and trying to fit them into the intelligence system."

At several points, Mr. Dulles emphasizes the role that science, with its elaborate detectors and computers, plays in modern intelligence operations. In this area, he hints at far more than he tells.

The famed Berlin tunnel gave the CIA some breathless moments. Since Berlin winters are cold, the tunnel had a heating system. The first time it snowed, the snow above the tunnel melted in a tell-tale trail into Communist East Berlin. The western operators quickly installed refrigeration devices.

Of special interest is Mr. Dulles's comment that perhaps one reason the Communist Chinese have taken direct military action so often is because

they have neither the time nor the resources to develop techniques of subversion comparable to those of the Soviet Union.

Significantly, Mr. Dulles recommends that the United States not "limit our response to the Communist strategy of take-over solely to those cases where we are invited in by a government still in power, or even to instances where a threatened country has first exhausted its own, possibly meager, resources in the 'good fight' against Communism." This takes in a great deal of territory and obviously is a policy which has to be executed with much wisdom in this world of increasingly sensitive, independent nations. If it backfires, the detonation could be earthshaking.

In company with many other government officials, Mr. Dulles is understandably alarmed by the number of times that American news media have exposed American secrets. He suggests, among other remedies, that leaders of the news industry meet with government officials to determine how the press can be kept confidentially advised as to what matters must remain secret in the interest of national security.

Mr. Dulles's acknowledged purpose is to give the public enough understanding of the CIA so that it will support intelligence efforts and not demand public accountings of secret projects in a way which will damage the United States.

The President has complete authority over the CIA and actively exercises it, Mr. Dulles reports. In other words, he sees no danger that the CIA will, as some critics fear, become a secret policymaker or a type of secret police threatening to democracy.